For the last five years, New Zealand has been able to have the cake and eat it too with regards to China and the United States. Is that all about to change?
Last month marked one year since the publication of New Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement, which criticized China’s behavior as incongruent to the existing rules-based order and saw the straining in regional stability as a potential threat to New Zealand security. Since then, it’s fair to say its been a tumultuous year for our relationship with China; not least because of the recent statements issued by the Chinese Consulate General in Auckland that criticized media coverage on the clash at the University of Auckland as biased and praised the Chinese students involved; the Huawei controversy and the GCSB’s decision to exclude its 5G network from rollout; New Zealand joining in international rebuke over China’s treatment of its Uighur population; the highly suspicious burglaries of Professor Anne-Marie Brady earlier this year – handiwork that all but points to China; plus the mounting concerns regarding China’s influence in New Zealand’s politics.
Yet, it wasn’t so long ago that China and New Zealand had fostered a unique and special relationship predicated on a string of economic and diplomatic firsts. In fact, in 2013 the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand characterized the two countries’ friendship as “a model to other Western countries”. And more recently in 2017, another Chinese diplomat lauded the standing New Zealand-China relations as akin to the closeness China enjoyed with communist Albania in the early 1960s.
So, when did it all turn a bit sour?
Well to begin with, New Zealand walks a tight rope in wanting to remain servile to both China and the United States. It’s in the precarious position of having China as its top trading partner and the United States as its security partner: an awkward and increasingly disjointed arrangement that strains under the great-power competition between the two.
Much of New Zealand’s hawkish stances towards China – say on fronts like Huawei – is to directly appease the United States and to preserve its security ties (in this case the Five Eyes alliance). Indeed, the rise of China and the manner of its ascent makes American security all the more valuable for New Zealand to hedge.
Yet otherwise, New Zealand remains steadfastly committed in remaining ingratiating towards China and securing economic interests that’s vested in the relationship. This month delegations from Wellington and Beijing are expected the finish the eighth round in trade talks to upgrade the New Zealand-China FTA to the same terms as the Australia-China FTA. It’s hardly surprising then that Prime Minister Ardern appears reluctant to deviate from her government’s soft line and put these trade talks – or any other economic interest – at risk.
You can see this manifested in a long list of cushy stances the government has adopted on China. It’s was in plain sight in the Prime Minister’s largely dismissive response to the harassment of Professor Anne-Marie Brady, which is widely thought to be at the hands of Beijing’s spy agency Ministry of State Security. Or her government’s lacking criticism on Chinese aggression in the South China Sea – a silence that’s growing louder in the region.
So, it certainly came as a surprise that reports yesterday morning appeared to suggest a change in tact. On Monday officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) met with Chinese Government representatives to address and raise concern about the recent comments made by the China Consulate in Auckland. These comments, which voiced support for university students involved in a physical altercation with pro-Hong Kong protestors, were considered incongruous to New Zealand’s laws on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
A week prior however, no one looked to raise an eyebrow that this government was poised again to shirk confrontation and refrain from relaying the warning out of Canberra. Two weeks ago, Australian foreign affairs minister Marise Payne cautioned all foreign diplomatic representatives that any interference to the exercise of freedom of speech will not be tolerated; a tacit chide against the Chinese consul-general in Brisbane for praising the “patriotic behavior” of Chinese students involved in a skirmish with pro-Hong Kong protesters. In what considerably stopped short from any echo of disapproval, Winston Peters initially responded to the Chinese Consulate General’s statements by benignly reaffirming that New Zealand values the right to peaceful protest and freedom of expression.
What’s interesting though, is that while New Zealand routinely dances to the tugs and pulls of Washington and Beijing, it’s hardly alone in doing so. From Japan and South Korea, to Chile and Brazil, to Germany, Australia, Thailand, Peru, and the Philippines – each have their own recital in tiptoeing around issues with China as their largest trading partner and the United States as their security ally.
At the moment, neither the Chinese or the U.S government is demanding that its either us or them. At least for now that is. Already we have seen the pressure to choose sides on specific issues, like Huawei, which is a sure precursor for things to come for New Zealand’s foreign policy.
With this in mind, what might be useful is looking at how these countries – and the deft contortions they go through to satisfy Washington and Beijing – could serve as a guideline for developing a coherent strategy.
Take South Korea for example. No other country on this list has had to more seriously contemplate the price of prosperity with regards to national security. Seoul is dependent on its military alliance with the United States to placate and deter North Korea, but does more trade with China than it does with the U.S and Japan combined (by a wide margin too).
With its New Southern Policy, President Moon Jae-in looks to recalibrate South Korea by deepening ties with South East Asia – including ASEAN member states like Indonesia and Vietnam, plus India – and curb its reliance on traditional partners like China and the United States. It’s a policy designed for diversification.
First unveiled back in 2017, the initiative was conceived on the back of a diplomatic standoff between Seoul and Beijing over the deployment of the U.S missile defence system known as THAAD. The severe Chinese retaliation to its deployment plus the ensuing trade war between the U.S and China, which has hurt South Korea’s export-driven economy, underscores the impetus behind Seoul’s diplomatic and economic expansion.
It’s beginning to bear fruit as well. According to the President Committee on New Southern Policy, trade volume between ASEAN countries and South Korea hit a record high of over $160 billion last year.
The seeds for a similar adjustment under this government already look to be taking root. In response to the Yuan falling to the lowest point in more than a decade yesterday, Shane Jones spoke on diversifying New Zealand exports away from the Chinese market. At the moment China imports 32% of all New Zealand’s dairy exports. Forestry exports are at 48%. It’s becoming increasingly apparent that space for diplomatic maneuvering is massively stifled by our trade dependency with China.
A Kiwi take on the Southern New Policy – with the negotiation of a post-Brexit UK-NZ FTA as the first port of call – could mitigate the future impact of intensifying U.S-China competition and give some breathing room for this government’s foreign policy.
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