Written 10.06.20
A discussion on China attaining its own After Victory moment.
Scope and Methodology.
In those sparse moments in history when the existing order crumbles, be it under the duress of war and conquest or the devastation of famine and plague, states confront the true reality of anarchy in international relations. Here, at the juncture between the old order and the new, the constitutive question in IR must be asked by state actors: how best to maintain order in an system of sovereign states void of any superior governing power, and how can this order be crafted in a fashion thatadvances the interests of the state. Any redistribution of power that creates new asymmetries provide newly powerful states the opportunity to re-establish a different regimen of rules and affairs. That is, leaders of these states are able to construct a new world order that is conducive and complementary to the betterment of one’s own nation. These junctures typically arrive in the aftermath of war when a single power or a coalition of states acquire a ‘preponderance of material power capabilities’ (Ikenberry, 2001). In those historical moments, whether it’s the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 or the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 or the Yalta Conference in 1945[1], newly hegemonic states are afforded the chance to not only restore post-war peace but design a new collective security order tailored to its liking. The fashioning of a new order by the hand of the leading state, fit with customized institutions and mechanisms to restrain power and curate peace, amounts to an after victory success.
In determining the prospect of China attaining its own after victory moment, the parameters and criteria of what constitutes international order building first need to be delineated and defined. From there, this framework can be applied against China’s policies and actions. If China is confirmed to be on the cusp of an after victory, or indeed has already clinched it, then dramatic and far-reaching consequences for the existing liberal-rules based order could be in store. However, it shouldn’t be misconstrued that the birth of a Sino-hegemonic order would automatically be incompatible with the existing order that’s forged on American preponderance. Thucydides Trap, as Chairman Xi has repeatedly reassured, is not fatalistic (Allison, 2017). In his works, Robert Gilpin elucidates that a new international order only reflects a redistribution of power, which in this case, would be ebbing away from Washington towards Beijing (Gilpin, 1981). By all accounts, it’s an episodic and historically ephemeral phenomenon: simply one hegemon ceding its predominance to another. Rather, it will be the character of this new international order that will dictate whether it usurps benignly or hostilely. However, it is not the purpose of this essay to surmise or make conjecture on what the character of a Sino-hegemonic order would be, or indeed attempt to model its rise.
To return to the matter at hand, the task remains in conceiving a framework – be it a series of metrics or a list of requirements – for evidence of China’s international order building (that’s shown to have considerable input on world politics) to be applied against. How would one recognize some international changing of the guard and then demonstrably prove it? This touches on a central issue in IR: the problem of political order(Ikenberry, 2001). Any empirical study on international order – how its devised, how it collapses, and any discussion of its appearance – is burdened in first having to make sense of the phrase. That is, because indicators for political order aren’t self-evident, academic due diligence in demarcating the boundaries and limits of ordermust first be drawn.
According to Hedley Bull, the distinction between world order and international order lies in the “former [being] composed of all peoples and the totality of relations among them, and the latter a system of rules settled among states” (Ikenberry, 2001). Furthermore, international order represents “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society”: the amalgamation of flourishing and fraying relations amongst states (Ikenberry, 2001). Conversely, political order refers to the mode of behaviour between states. It is the “’governing’ relations among nations ‘including its fundamental rules, principles and institutions’” (Bull, 1977). That is, the many structures that arrange and organize state relations. When these arrangements become tattered and undone, order is said to have collapsed; when a new arrangement has been re-established, then order has been restored. Our interest now becomes the principles, rules and institutions that entwine states together and gives characterto the order. China, if indeed it has attained after victory, must be the chief architect or driving force in specifying these principles, in applying these rules, and in creating these institutions.
With order now defined, we can now begin to unearth its different forms to use as a frame of reference for the Chinese Communist Party’s policies and strategies in order building. The three most important varieties of political order among states are those characterized by balance of power, hegemony, and constitutionalism. Of interest to us, are the latter two[2]. All orders represent the differing degrees in which power is exercised and distributed among states (Ikenberry, 2001). In this sense, order can be thought of as a spectrum in power asymmetries, with the coercive power empires enjoy over its domains on one pole (imperial order: a derivative of hegemonic order), and more subdued displays of power like normative setting on the other. Other differences include the restraints and mechanisms used to curtail state power and cultivate cohesion among states, and “the underlying conditions that render international order more or less stable” (Ikenberry, 2001).
Very briefly, the fluidity and variety of order can be seen in the different strategies and actions of leading states across historical junctures. In fact, orders typically exhibit characteristics of several types (Ikenberry, 2001). This variety is often the result of discrepancies in residual post-war power asymmetries and/or the leading state’s penchant for institutionalizing their power. The difference in order-building agendas of Britain in 1815 and the United states in 1919 and 1945 is one clear manifestation of this (Ikenberry, 2001). Consequentially, there is empirical wriggle room for China to achieve its own after victory moment, even if the order it is making isn’t recognizable by past settlement’s standards. Also, stable political order don’t require normative agreement, or shared norms, among its constituents. Instead, the order may be predicated on “exchange relations, coercion, or the operation of the balance of power” (Ikenberry, 2001). Furthermore, orders may be purely organic in their form – without contrived mechanisms or arrangements put in place. The spontaneity comes as states separately respond to the forces of anarchy in IR, reacting – in accordance to realist tradition – in balancing or bandwagoning tendencies. Because the actions of states are said to be spontaneous in nature, and not motivated by the hegemon per se, these orders are outside the scope of this essay.
Hegemonic orders can come in two types: either benevolent or coercive. Of the former, the order is organized around more reciprocal, consensual, and institutionalized relations: here power is exercised diffusely and more subtly (Ikenberry, 2001). The strong version of hegemonic order is built around direct and coercive domination of weaker and secondary states by the hegemon. When looking at the latest crackdown against pro-democracy protestors in Hong Kong and the continual escalation in the South China Sea, it’s would appear that China is more in the image of a strong hegemonic order. However, that isn’t to say that all of China’s regional cooperation isn’t benevolent.
In either case, we can conclude that China is a hegemonic power when:
1. The disparity in power capabilities incurs weaker states to bend to its demands and preferences;
2. A system of rules and rights, that are shown to be favourable for Chinese interests, have been established;
3. Compliance and participation within this order is maintained through military power, financial capital, market access, technology, and by other means. Direct coercion is another option, but enforcement typically comes in the form of either “carrots or sticks”;
4. “Ideological and status appeal” are also integral in the perpetuation of hegemonic orders (Ikenberry, 2001). China must demonstrate it has normative clout.
Constitutionalism is another type of order that’s also predicated on asymmetrical power relations. However, in this case, the most openly malign features of domination – as would be the case in imperial hegemonic orders – are subverted or buffered through institutional restraints on the exercise of power (Ikenberry, 2001). In more benign and consensual hegemonic orders, where restraints on hegemonic power are sufficiently developed, the order can be identified as constitutionalism. According to John Ikenberry, there are three essential characteristics to this order. The first is shared agreement exists over the principles of rules of order by way of participation and consent. There is some “meeting of minds” to outline what the “rules of the game” should be within this political order, and these “rules of the game” are seen to be conducive to a stable and benign order. Second, rules and institutions have binding and authoritative limits to the exercise of state power. Constitutions exists as legal framework which enshrines the constraints on power, and contain guiding principles, rights, protections and basic rules. Other legal constraints should also be observed, such as separation of powers and checks and balances (Ikenberry, 2001). Ultimately, constitutionalism is the manifestation of state power bound by the rules and principles of legitimate political institutions.
In this case, a constitutionalist Chinese order will be observed when:
1. The establishment of agreed-upon rules, rights, protections, and commitments, under the framework of a political institution, designed to advance Chinese goals and interests;
2. The three essential characteristics of constitutional political order, as noted above, are fulfilled.
In his book, John Ikenberry recognizesafter victoryas occurring at the beginning of hegemony. In this essay however, this observation is extended somewhat to assume that characteristics of both hegemonic orders andconstitutionalist political orders aggregates to the existence of hegemony, and thus signals an after victorysuccess. If however, only one of these orders is observed, then an after victory moment has not been achieved.
A Community of Common Destiny for Mankind: A New Chinese Order
Now that the parameters for after victoryhave been drawn, applying it against the actions and endeavours of the Chinese Communist Party in building its own order becomes the next task. China’s campaign for regional co-operation can be applied to this framework.
China’s regional cooperation has arrived in two waves. The first stage was founded on economic and trade interests, aiming at completing, in particular, an FTA with ASEAN. The second wave of cooperation, which was only galvanised after Xi Jinping came to power, is characterized by a quest for building an Asian community founded on several key concepts including the community of common interest, the community of common destiny, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road (Zhang & Xiaoyue, 2014). Xi Jinping’s efforts in attaining this Asian community has the etchings of a hegemonic order. It will be the focus of our study here.
Since 2012, China has sought to patch together regional cooperation in its own vision. This community-building exercise is characterized by efforts at deeper regional integration that appeals to a pan-Asian identity among its Asian neighbours. It is the first time that China has systematically sought to insert itself into the whole region by historical and cultural linkages rather than simply ingratiating itself by economic incentives (Zhang & Xiaoyue, 2014).
The first manifestation of this effort is the propagation of the concept “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体) (CCD). The concept, which is becoming increasingly touted on international occasions, essentially serves as the guiding philosophy for China’s approach to foreign policy issues such as trade, climate change, cyber operations, and security cooperation (Tobin, 2018). China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, wrote in August 2018, “Building a community of common destiny for mankind is the overall goal of China’s foreign affairs work in the new era.” It provides the pathway, he noted, for the establishment of a “new type of international relations” that enables and nurtures China’s national rejuvenation (Tobin, 2018). Effectively, CCD outlines a vision for transforming the international landscape to carve China as the global pre-eminent power: a goal for new kind of global governance. The pluralist language clearly seeks to allay fears of China’s rise and conforms to Beijing’s long-term strategy to maintain a peaceful ‘period of strategic opportunity’ for the first two to three decades of the 21stcentury to further develop (Zhang D. , 2018). The concept however, also contains elements of hegemonic order building, by way of bolstering its ideological and status appeal: criteria number 4. For example in February 2017, the 55thsession of the United Nations Commission for Social Development passed a resolution titled Social Dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Zhang D. , 2018). The resolution was peppered with CCD terminology and ideas, which at least subliminally endorsed or validated China’s new concept on a global scale. The perpetuation of Chinese values and ideas within an institutional framework, such as that of the United Nations, is cornerstone to hegemonic orders.
The second manifestation of Chinese efforts for a new order, is in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Zhang & Xiaoyue, 2014). Xi’s signature BRI is perhaps the most visible demonstration of China materializing CCD into its foreign policy. In tangent with the work of BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China has set up the Belt and Road Fund to deepen links between itself and the rest of Asia, Africa and Europe (Zhang D. , 2018). Development projects funded by Chinese loans, economic incentives in partnering with BRI, and copious amounts of aid pledged to developing countries, all congeal into soft power for China. There is clear hegemonic traits to this economic diplomacy, including criteria 1 through to 3. The case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is a case in point. After failing to pay the principle of its loan, and then the interest on that loan, to China Merchants Port (a Chinese conglomerate), the Sri Lankan government agreed to hand over the port and 15,000 acres to China to settle its financial woes. The disparity in power capabilities between China and Sri Lanka and the surrendering of the port in a 99 year lease would suggest that criteria 1 – the disparity in power capabilities incurs weaker states to bend to its demands – has been fulfilled. Predatorial loan deals, which includes targeting developing countries strategic assets like resources, mines, port access rights, and so forth as collateral, and which China has been criticized for, also qualifies as a system of rules and rights are shown to be favourable to the Chinese (criteria 2). Criteria 3 - compliance and participation within this order is maintained through… carrots or stick – is also satisfied when nations become economically over-dependent to China and their sovereignty becomes stifled to the demands from Beijing. This form of neo-colonialism is seen to be rampant in China’s enormous foreign direct investment schemes in Africa (Madeleine, 2018). Whether BRI is a façade for debt diplomacy, that is China deliberately straddles countries into debt to acquire strategic assets, or not is relatively moot in point. BRI remains an important vessel for CCD aspirations and is largely successful in growing China’s influence around the globe and organizing a hegemonic order with those it does dealings with.
This leaves China’s efforts in crafting an order in the image of constitutionalism. The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, at Beijing’s impetus, represented an historic moment for China’s regionalism (Zhang & Xiaoyue, 2014). Due to its pre-eminent position, China has been able to advance its own interests by framing the organization’s agenda with principles borrowed from its own “New Security Concept”; which stresses ideals such as non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and sovereign equality (Clarke, n.d.). Ideals which are of chief importance in certifying China’s sovereignty claims of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and now more pertinently Hong Kong. SCO also serves to champion China’s grand strategy of “peaceful rise” by cultivating warm diplomatic relations with the handful member states within the alliance by deepening cooperation and mutual trust. The normative agenda that China has able to imprint in SCO, through its declarations and practical measures, clearly conform to China’s own agenda. Looking at the criteria for constitutionalism, it is clear that SCO has sought to advance Beijing’s foreign policy strategies through normative practices and that SCO satisfies the three characteristics described by John Ikenberry.
The authority of the hegemonic state and the cohesion of hegemonic order are ultimately tethered to the predominance of power of the leading state, and when that power declines, the hegemonic order will erode with it (Ikenberry, 2001). Devastated by the toll of COVID-19, and now embroiled in nationwide protests ignited by police brutality, could we be witnessing the earliest signs that American hegemony unravelling[3] (David E. Sanger, 2020)? If so, it certainly opens the door for a new Sino-hegemonic order, and already early and considerable signs indicate that China has achieved in doing so. As to whether China has clinched after victory, certainly indications show that both hegemonic and constitutional elements have been accomplished. There is remains doubt however, especially in Western quarters, about how “peaceful” China’s rise is with its assertiveness in Hong Kong, South China Sea, unfair trade practices and so forth, and this certainly taints its “ideological and status appeal” (criteria 4). However, it would be reasonable to assess that China has accomplished after victoryon a regional scale, given the orders it has built through “community of common destiny for mankind”; its economic diplomacy like BRI; and the multilateral frameworks it has designed like the SCO.
Bibliography
Allison, G. (2017, June 9). The Thucydides Trap. Retrieved from foreignpolicy.com: https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/
Bull, H. (1977). The Anarachical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.London: Macmillan.
Clarke, M. (n.d.). China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Dynamics of “New Regionalism,” “Vassalization,” and Geopolitics in Central Asia. Retrieved from core.ac.uk: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143873922.pdf
David E. Sanger, E. S. (2020, June 1). As Virus Toll Preoccupies U.S., Rivals Test Limits of American Power . Retrieved from www.nytimes.com: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/coronavirus-global-competition-russia-china-iran-north-korea.html?smtyp=cur&smid=fb-nytimes&fbclid=IwAR06WoZxk-QeH5p3f8ucoaWuFM1kW9yw2J5l1GX2_wTgfc6zeWZ8UksYGiA
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[1]The list of these post-war orders to be referred henceforth as ‘settlements.’ [2]Balance of power orders are manifestations of the anarchic forces at play – that is, states don’t actively partake in engineering or shaping order, and as such, it fails to satisfy the essence of after victory. [3]While Washington confronts the sobering realities of COVID-19 and now battles to contain widespread turmoil, Russia has flown “dangerously close” to U.S Navy Patrol Plane in the Mediterranean; tensions have flared again on the Indian-Chinese border, with the PLA having conducted a large-scale drill earlier this week; the DPRK have affirmed that they will be accelerating their nuclear deterrent, dashing any hopes that vague promises of disarmament made to the Trump Administration will ever eventuate; and now Iran is reportedly also re-establishing its own nuclear capabilities. Not only are traditional rivals testing the limits of American power but its ideological and status appeal (criteria 4) are becoming tarnished too. U.S foreign policy as a champion for democracy, human rights and rule of law abroad begins to ring hollow – even hypocritical – while the country is gripped by nationwide demonstrations against police brutality, and systemic racism at large, and President Trump threatens to use the military against protestors. American disparagement of autocrats and authoritarian regimes naturally calls into question the country’s own moral authority.
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