Written 01. 05. 20
Abstract
COVID-19 will prove to be a catastrophic agent of change for Sino-US bilateral ties. How the East Asian landscape might look in its aftermath is obviously contingent upon many varying factors; though any fraying in US-China ties will necessitate a recalibration in East Asian international relations, and might prelude the worsening of flashpoints across the region – be it in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, South and East China Sea, North Korea and/or in new arenas entirely. Against this backdrop, East Asian states will need to reconcile how to best preserve its economic interests vested in Chinese trade and markets without undermining its own security apparatus by alienating the U.S and abrogating their military or intelligence agreements with Washington.
Introduction
Over the course of this decade, notably since Xi Jinping became Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and after President Trump’s inauguration, ties between the U.S and China have turbulently deteriorated. Old hopes that China would mature into a responsible stakeholder upon its economic liberalization have long been dashed, despite Washington’s best efforts and expectations. Western analysts and politicians envisioned capitalist markets and an integrated economy having a placating effect: one that would induce democratic reforms and goad China into aligning itself with the existing liberal rules-based order. Washington’s policy of engagement was designed to further nurture this, and its advocates predicted it would nudge Beijing on a path where its interests would eventually converge with those of the U.S. Yet as China has grown into an economic superpower without shedding its authoritarian skin, analysts are consternating over what went wrong. Many now view the current crisis a juncture in the two countries’ relationship, and amongst them China hawks see an opportunity.
Exacerbating Tensions and Accelerating Trends: COVID-19 and U.S-China Relations
Because of how virulent COVID-19 has proven and the extent of its economic devastation, the political climate in the U.S is now ripe for a hardened approach against China (under the pretext that the CCP is culpable and guilty of obfuscation and delay). In a very divided Congress, an appetite for punitive measures against Beijing is perhaps the only area of consensus from members on both sides of the aisle. Below lists courses of retaliation being touted by key U.S lawmakers.
· Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C) has made plain that the Chinese government bears full responsibility for the havoc wrecked in the U.S – not Trump or his administration’s response – and proposed to repudiate Treasury debt owed to China (“because they should be paying us”), implement a “pandemic tariff” on Chinese goods, and impose (unspecified) sanctions on Chinese officials (Connolly, 2020).
· Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) has introduced legislation – the Stop China-Originated Viral Infectious Diseases (COVID) Act – that would “make China legally and financially liable for unleashing COVID-19 infection on our country” (Johnson, 2020).
· Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla) is reviving old conversations on “decoupling”the two biggest economies; this time in condemning America’s dependence on China for its medical equipment and drugs, he’s proposed bringing manufacturing back for goods vital to national security – a move towards autarky for critical goods. A bill he introduced in March – which received bipartisan backing – would alleviate China’s chokehold on the global pharmaceutical supply chain and remove any leverage held by the CCP (Edmondson, 2020). Any concerted effort by the U.S to wean itself off supply chains dominated by China will have major repercussions for the rest of East Asia and the global economy.
· Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) has introduced a bill – the Forging Operational Resistance to Chinese Expansion (FORCE) Act – that seeks $43 billion in funding for military related assets to thwart China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. (In a statement announcing the bill, Cotton warned that China will try to exploit the frailty of states overwhelmed by COVID-19.) In early April, Cotton also introduced legislation that would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and allow U.S citizens to sue China for deaths and economic harm caused by the virus (Tabler, 2020).
This appetite for retribution isn’t confined to Congress either. U.S federal courts have also seen a flurry of lawsuits demanding compensation from China for COVID-19. On April 21, Missouri’s attorney general filed a civil suit in federal court against the CCP, the government of Wuhan and Hubei province, and a host of other Chinese entities, for negligent and deceitful behaviour. On April 22, Mississippi announced that it also planned to sue China, suggesting that more lawsuits are likely to come (Altiera & Rocca, 2020). (These lawsuits are intended to prompt Congress to pass legislation which allows U.S citizens to sue foreign states for damage caused by malicious or negligent actions, rather than secure victory in court.)
Yet as of late April, Trump has adopted a more refrained approach in addressing China. Whether or not this is to remain relatively ingratiating while the U.S is a benefactor of Chinese medical equipment and avoid jeopardising the phase one trade deal signed in January is relatively moot in point, though – in either case – his conciliatory tone is poised to sharpen (Desiderio & Toosi, 2020). The National Republican Senatorial Committee is urging an anti-China assault over coronavirus and in a 57-page memo detailed three main lines of assault: That China is culpable for the virus “by covering it up”, that democrats are “soft on China”, and that Republicans will “push for sanctions on China for its role in this pandemic” (Isenstadt, 2020). It’s political arsenal that Trump – who is known for his visceral attacks and scapegoating tactics (whether they’re justified or not) – will likely employ to redirect blame and bolster his re-election prospects. In fact in the coming week, senior officials across multiple government agencies are expected to begin drafting retaliatory measures against Beijing (Leonning, 2020).
It’s worth noting that in a new Pew Research Center survey from March, two-thirds of respondents said they now have an unfavourable view of China; the worst rating for the country since the Center began asking the question in 2005 (Lynch, 2020). The potential for economic fatigue, grief and bitterness to be fomented by Trump into a populist movement, which casts America’s plights as the doings of Beijing, is real as it is likely. It would almost certainly bring Sinophobia into the mainstream political fold and further taint ties with Beijing.
A New Paradigm: East Asia in the Wake of Fractured U.S-China Relations
East Asian security is tethered to U.S-Sino stability. The deft diplomatic contortions states undergo to appease Beijing – and protect important economic interests – without alienating Washington – an important security ally and a bulwark against China’s growing influence – is symptomatic however, of the fragility in this regional order. The Huawei controversy last year is a case in point. The inclusion of Huawei infrastructure, a Chinese ICT conglomerate with links to the CCP, in sensitive national telecommunication networks threatened to splinter the region into conflicting blocs: States that permitted the technology under the aegis of Beijing and those that don’t at the behest of Washington’s national security directive (Washington has accused the company of including security vulnerabilities in its hardware that could be used for espionage by Beijing). Trump’s administration has warned that intelligence sharing with countries that allow Huawei into its 5G network will be re-evaluated; leaving export-driven countries like South Korea in the familiar predicament of either estranging its biggest trading partner or defying its crucial security ally. COVID-19, and tattering U.S-China relations, will precipitate similar zero-sum scenarios in East Asia.
As Western reproval of the Chinese government’s alleged malfeasance in the pandemic galvanizes into a broad diplomatic backlash – one spearheaded by GOP strategists and lawmakers – East Asian relations with Beijing are already unravelling. For Tokyo, the coronavirus outbreak has exposed cracks in its economic relationship with Beijing and has derailed efforts to restore amicable ties with its powerful neighbour, which has been strained by competing sovereignty claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands(Smith, 2020). Elsewhere in Seoul, Hanoi, and Ulaanbaatar, the CCP’s handling of COVID-19 will only entrench existing perceptions of China (which is dominated by scepticism). Whether this will have a material impact on their strategic relationship with Beijing is another matter, as economic co-operation remains an effective ballast for China.
Also, flashpoints across East Asia are now becoming centrepiece to the shifting geopolitics. The U.S navy have conducted two “freedom of navigation operations” near the Spratlys earlier this week, in what is a direct challenge to China’s claim to the disputed island chain (Lendon, 2020). Prior to that, Beijing had been asserting itself in the region having deployed a survey ship flanked by coast guards and other vessels into the South China Sea. A crackdown against pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong on 18thApril and regular fighter patrols near Taiwan are other signals that “its [China’s] military and foreign affairs, previously put on hold, are back on track” (Reuters, 2020). Expect to see a continued escalation across flashpoints, as Beijing and Washington jockey for relative gains in the wake of COVID-19.
Conclusion
International relations in East Asia will be directly affected by deteriorating US-China ties: The underpinnings of the regional security, forged on American-Sino co-operation, dictate as much. How well states can reconcile economic interests procured from warm ties with Beijing, against national security concerns that are often conflicting, will largely determine in what direction East Asia will go: East if easily, or further West if not.
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